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Abstract 
This article calculates the theoretical probability of 
finding repeated primes in a given sample of 
unbiased issued digital certificates. These values 
can be used as reference for developing a statistical 
procedure to audit and control the behavioral 
pattern of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), thus 
allowing the detection of operational anomalies and 
the prevention of vulnerabilities of this nature. 
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1. Introduction
The certificates issued by a public key 
infrastructure (PKI) are widely used in military 
environments and systems, as well as in civil, 
public or private networks, LANs or WANs, and 
even in the Internet. Among other applications, they 
can be used for the login and authentication of 
users, equipments and systems, encryption and 
digital signatures, non-repudiation, determination of 
session keys, etc. 
The certificates issued by a PKI include, among 
others, a module m and a number e (usually 65537), 
known as “public key”, and a number d, known as 
“private key”. The m value, which has a t size 
(measured in bits), is obtained by multiplying 2 
prime values. This trio (m, e, d) is calculated by the 
PKI when the pertinent digital certificate is 
requested and is delivered to a user who will own it.  
A vulnerability occurs1 if the PKI reveals an 
anomaly when calculating the m values or upon the 
issuance of certificates in which two or more users 
share any prime factor of their respective modules.  
This information allows to circumvent the 
security provided by RSA and to easily obtain the 
1 The security of the RSA system is based on the 
difficulty of factorizing the modules m (i.e., t=1024, 2048 
or 4096 bits as currently used) within an acceptable time 
frame in order to preserve the secret d key. Knowing one 
of the prime factors of a given module makes it possible 
to calculate the other factor and the d key with no 
difficulty.   
private key, thus enabling access to the information 
intended to be protected.   
Current systems are highly complex and it is not 
easy to detect certain types of errors [7]. The 
traditional method consists in the reading and 
control of the code lines that make up the PKI. The 
detection of errors, on the other hand, is a reality 
with many precedents that can be reviewed [1,9].  
An interesting discussion may take place 
regarding the nature of such errors: innocent “bugs” 
that beat the tests and leaked through only to be 
detected years after their creation or that were 
“planted” with the intention of debilitating the 
security system.  
Other researchers [8] evaluated more than a 
million public key certificates and discovered that 
about 5% of them shared prime factors. Is this a 
value to be expected, considering the magnitude of 
the analyzed sample, or is it beyond possibilities, 
considering the size of the analyzed modules and 
the number of possible primes? 
This work and its precedents [2-6] determine the 
Probability Function of finding or not finding 
collisions of prime factors in a variable sample 
space composed by certificates. Such probabilities 
(unbiased and free of anomalies because they were 
calculated theoretically) could be used as reference 
values to audit and control the behaviour of a 
specific PKI.  
Sections 2 and 3 present a probabilistic model to 
perform experiment E, its possible results, the 
methodology to determine the aforementioned 
results and, finally, the resulting formulas that will 
allow to estimate the probabilities of finding 
repeated primes size t in samples size mu, whether 
repeated primes size t are present or not. 
Section 4 presents the Probability Function that 
prevails in a theoretical PKI that is unbiased and 
free of anomalies.  
Section 5 presents different formulas to 
calculate large factorials, as required by the 
formulas obtained in the previous sections. 
Section 6 presents conclusions and possible 
follow-ups to this research: determination of the 
probabilistic model hidden in a PKI to be analyzed, 
using tools derived from statistical inference. And, 
lastly, the comparison between theoretical values 
and those obtained empirically that will allow to 
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determine the presence of biases or anomalies. The 
final goal would be the development of a software 
to make the auditing of the PKI possible.  
2. Number of certificates issuable by a
PKI 
Given hypothesis2 H1: the size of prime values 
generated by the PKI, shown here as b, is half the 
value t of the modules. For instance, if t=1024 the 
prime values shall then be size b=512 bits. 
Being P1 the set of prime numbers size b. 
P1=p / p primo; 2
b-1
< p <2
b. (Eq.1) 
The cardinal or number of elements of P1 – 
shown here as p1 – can be calculated with an 
equation associated to the Theorem of Prime 
Numbers3: 
(Eq.2) 
 
(Eq.3) 
Being M1 the set of all the public modules that 
can be determined based on the number of P1 
elements: 
 (Eq.4) 
We assume here a different work hypothesis 
H2: the PKI shall not issue certificates resulting 
from the same prime factor. This means that the 
public module shall not be a square number.  
The cardinal of M1 (shown as m1) is the number 
of subsets of P1 consisting of 2 elements, since each 
public module is the product of 2 prime values and 
because the order of multiplication is irrelevant due 
to the commutativity of the product. 
.
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(Eq.5) 
3. Experiment E, Probabilistic Model
and its Probability Function 
2 Different hypotheses regarding context and 
environment will be presented throughout this work. 
They will be described and numbered in order of 
appearance.  
3 Conjectured by German mathematician Carl Gauss 
(1777-1855) and confirmed independently by Belgian 
mathematician Charles-Jean de la Vallée Poussin (1866-
1962) and French mathematician Jacques Hadamard 
(1865-1963). 
3.1 Definition of Experiment E 
Experiment E is laid out: request the PKI a number 
mu of certificates and assemble with them the set 
MU, called “sample”. 
MU=m / m is a public module size t 
Card(MU)=mu. 
(4)
 
(Eq.6) 
(Eq.7) 
We assume here hypothesis H3: the resulting 
modules m are unbiased. This determines a 
probabilistic model in which the probability of 
obtaining any module is equiprobable. 
3.2 Experiment Outcomes 
This experiment can have 2 outcomes or events: 
R = {r1 ; r2}. (Eq.8) 
- r1: where in the set MU there are no modules 
m sharing any prime factor. In this case it 
will be said that there are no collisions of 
prime factors. 
- r2: where in the set MU there are 2 or more 
modules m repeating prime factors. In this 
case it will be said that there are collisions of 
prime factors.   
To determine the experiment outcome4 we will 
use the Highest Common Denominator of all 
modules, taken 2 at a time:  
(Eq.9) 
Therefore, if all the values obtained from mcd 
are 1, the experiment had an outcome r1 because it 
was not verified that there were repeated primes in 
those modules. Otherwise, the experiment had an 
outcome r2. 
The process of applying experiment E to all 
possible MU sets, determines 2 sets: R1 and R2: 
R1 = { MU / R(MU) = r1 }. (Eq.10) 
R2 = { MU / R(MU) = r2 }. (Eq.11) 
These sets have the following properties: 
Disjoints: 
4 It could be requested from the PKI to provide the 
prime factors of the module together with the rest of the 
certificate information. Then, it will suffice to just check 
whether there are repeated primes or not in the sample. 
Both tests, the mcd estimation and the latter, have a 
computational cost that will not be analyzed here. It is 
recommended to choose the least complex of the two. 
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R1R2=. (Eq.12) 
a) Complementary:
R1  R2 = EM(E). (Eq.13) 
Where EM(E) is the Sample Space of Experiment E, 
meaning all MU sets size mu. 
EM(E)=m1mu (Eq.14) 
Assuming hypothesis H4: the PKI does not 
“remember” the issued certificates. Therefore, it 
could repeat modules in its sample space5.  
We define the Probability Function in accordance 
with the properties of R1 and R2 
. 
. 
(Eq.15) 
(Eq.16) 
We will use the classic theory6 to determine the 
value of these probabilities. To this purpose, the 
cardinal of each set and the total of the sample 
space must be calculated.  
3.3 Cardinality of R1 and R2 
The cardinal of R1 is the number of sets MU, size 
mu, consisting of modules size t, in which it is 
verified that there are no collisions of primes.  
Given the sets P1 y M1 shown in Eq(1) and 
Eq(3), respectively, the first element of MU could 
be any of the m1 elements of M1. 
The second element should be a co-prime 
module of the first element in the sample. To this 
purpose, we determine set P2 as the set of numbers 
that results from removing numbers p and q that 
make up the first element of set P1.  
(Eq.17) 
 
(Eq.18) 
Being M2 is the set of all the modules that can 
be generated with P2, whose cardinal m2 is 
calculated as the combinatorial of all the elements 
of P2, taken 2 at a time.  
5 The assumption of another hypothesis regarding the 
PKI would imply a change in the size of the sample 
space. 
6 The Theory of Probabilities was initiated by Pierre de 
Fermat (1601-1665) and Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). 
However, the first axiomatic definition of probability is 
attributed to Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827): the 
probability of an event being the ratio between the 
number of favorable outcomes and the total number of 
possible outcomes.  
(Eq.19) 
 (Eq.20) 
(Eq.21) 
Following the same reasoning, the third element 
of the sample will be a co-prime module with the 
first and the second element, taken 2 at a time. To 
this purpose, we determine the set of prime 
numbers P3 that results from removing from P2 
factors p y q that make up its second element.  
(Eq.22) 
 (Eq.23) 
Being M3 the set all the modules that can be 
generated with P3.
(Eq.24)
(Eq.25) 
(Eq.26) 
In general, for any value i between 1 and mu, 
we have: 
(Eq.27) 
(Eq.28) 
Being Mi the set of all the modules resulting as a 
product of the elements of Pi: 
(Eq.29) 
. (Eq.30)
(Eq.31) 
It can be observed that each cardinal of the Mi 
sets is expressed in function of the cardinal of M1.
This procedure is followed until the last module 
of the sample is reached: The module number mu is 
the quantity expected in experiment E.  
1)R(p)R(p 21 
)(1)( 12 RpRp 
 .q;pP2P 1 
.2)P(Card)P(Card2p 12 
 .2Pq,p;qp;pqmm2M 
.
2
)1p(p
2
p
)2M(Card2m
222 






2
)3p)(2p(
2
2p
2m
111 




 

 .q;p2P3P 
.4.)1P(Card2)2P(Card)3P(Card3p 
 3Pq,p;qp;pqmm3M 
2
)13p(3p
2
3p)3M(Card3m








2
)51p)(41p(
2
4p
3m
1 





 

 .q;p1iPPi 
).1i(2.)P(Card2)P(Card)P(Cardip 11ii  
 .iPq,p;qp;pqmmMi 
2
)1ip(ip
2
ip)iM(Cardim








  
2
1)1i(21p)1i(21p
2
)1i(2ip
im






 

JCS&T Vol. 16  No. 2 November 2016
86
(Eq.32) 
(Eq.33) 
Given Mmu the set of all the modules that can be 
generated with Pmu
(Eq.34) 
(Eq.35) 
(Eq.36) 
All the modules of the MU set are co-primes 
taken 2 at a time.  
Finally, the cardinal of the set of all the samples 
of modules mu in which there are no collisions of 
primes is determined by: 
. 
(Eq.37) 
. (Eq.38) 
Then, 
. 
(Eq.39) 
3.4 Cardinality of R2 
Since R1 y R2 are disjoints and complementary, as 
shown in Eq(12) to  Eq(14), then: 
(Eq.40) 
(Eq.41) 
Being m1 the number of modules that can be 
calculated with the prime factors of the set P1,
whose cardinal is the value p1 and mu being the 
number of modules of each sample.  
3.5 Probability Function 
As indicated in (16-17), then: 
 
(Eq.42) 
. (Eq.43) 
Then, as per (Eq.5): 
. 
(Eq.44) 
. 
(Eq.45) 
(Eq.46) 
4. Calculating large factorials
These equations require solving quite large 
factorials whose computational complexity hinder 
the calculation. As an example, we will present 
some equations to estimate the factorial value: 
. (Eq.47) 
. (Eq.48) 
. (Eq.49) 
Eq(47) and Eq(48) are known as Stirling7’s and 
Eq(49) as Ramanujan8’s equations:  
(Eq.50) 
. (Eq.51) 
(Eq.52) 
Eq(50), Eq(51) and Eq(52) are known as 
Burnside’s9, Gosper’s10 and Batir’s11 equations, 
respectively. 
5. Conclusions and future work
We have presented equations to calculate the 
mathematical probabilities of finding collisions of 
primes in a sample based on a source that is 
unbiased and free of anomalies.  
The existence of statistical permanence can be 
7 James Stirling (1692-1770). Scottish mathematician. 
8 Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887-1920). Indian mathe-
matician. He did not leave behind a demonstration of his 
equation. It was demonstrated by the Russian 
mathematician Ekatherina Karatsuba in the year 2000. 
9 William Burnside (1852-1927). English mathe-
matician. 
10 Ralph Gosper, Jr. (1943- ). American mathematician 
and computer scientist. 
11 Necdet Batir (1959 - ). Turkish mathematician. 
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assumed as a hypothesis, which means that 
throughout the performance of experiment E 
applied to a specific PKI, its unknown probabilistic 
model can be discovered with the use of statistical 
tools.  
Should discrepancies between the reference 
values proposed by this work and those obtained by 
“direct experience” be verified, it would indicate 
the existence of an anomaly in the behavior of the 
PKI. 
In sum, this work sets out issues to continue 
researching and enable the development of a 
software to audit and control PKI anomalies.  
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